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This is yet another valuable contribution to the study of counterinsurgency by Thomas 
Mockaitis, an admirable companion to his previous effort, British Counterinsurgency, 
1919-60 (London: Macmillan, 1990). It is well-researched and documented, drawing on a 
wide range of available primary and secondary sources. These open sources are 
supplemented by interviews with serving and retired military officers.  
The work includes four case studies of British counterinsurgency, post -imperial 
campaigns: the Indonesian Confrontation (1962-66), South Arabia (1962 -67), Dhofar 
(1967-75) and Northern Ireland (since 1969), along with chapters assessing the overall 
evolution of doctrine and the lessons learnt. The choice of case studies provides a useful 
range of settings and situations from urban opera tions in Aden and Belfast, to the dense 
jungles of Borneo, the desert areas of the Radfan and remote Dhofar. The post-imperial 
era also saw British forces oper ating in a far greater variety of roles than the withdrawal 
from empire scenario revisited in Aden. The new roles involved rendering military 
assistance to re cently independent Malaysia to combat Indonesian aggression, providing 
advice and leadership to Omani forces against communist insurgents and, finally, in 
Northern Ireland, fulfilling their constitutional role in aid to the civil power.  
The general principles which the British Army developed in the imperial era (minimum 
force, civil-military cooperation and tactical flexibility) proved their worth once more in 
post-imperial counterinsurgency campaigns. Yet these general principles and the vast 
experience gained from a half century of fighting insurgents was not distilled into a 
comprehensive doctrine and taught to serving officers. Thus, the application of past 
experience in post-imperial conflicts was uneven. During the Indonesian Confrontation 
British forces were at a consid erable advantage under the command of General Walter 
Walker, who had served in the Malayan campaign and was author of the closest thing to 
an unofficial counterinsurgency "bible" for two decades, The Conduct of Anti-terrorist 
Operations in Malaya . Other campaigns were not as fortunate. Operations in South 
Arabia lacked focus and in rural areas relied on the false economy of aerial bombardment 
at the expense of a hearts-and-minds effort, which had proven so successful in other 
conflicts. This shortfall contributed, along with other factors, to the only clear cut defeat 
in the post-imperial era. In Dhofar British officers serving the Sultan of Oman developed 
a highly effective intelligence gathering network, despite difficult conditions. This effort 
was closely linked to an effective hearts-and-minds campaign and a devolved command 
and control structure which eventually choked off the communist insurgency. It is not 
surprising that North ern Ireland, by far the longest and most complex counterinsurgency 
campaign the British Army has ever fought, would experience the greatest changes. The 
Army entered the streets of Belfast and Londonderry with little guidance or established 
policies. Mistakes were made in the early years, sometimes from a misapplication of 
lessons from previous campaigns, such as the use of internment-without-trial in 1971-72, 
but over time the security forces adapted to the situation relearning past lessons and 
developing new approaches. The period since the early 1970s has seen a formalization of 
British counterinsurgency doctrine, much of it based on the experience of Northern 
Ireland, which now spans six volumes, and that conflict has now replaced Malaya as the 
example to be taught.  
The author identifies the "media revolution" of recent decades as being the most 
significant difference between the imperial and post-imperial eras. Al though the British 
Army had occasionally experienced the wrath of a hostile press in earlier years, most 
notably during the Anglo-Irish War (1919-21) and during the Zionist insurgency (1945-
48), intense media scrutiny, especially with the advent of television, had a profound 
effect on the conduct of operations. For example, in 1963 media coverage of a campaign 
of aerial bombardment and village clearing in the Radfan area of South Arabia triggered a 
public outcry. Similar operations in the Radfan during the 1950s, without the media 
present, went largely unnoticed, despite much higher casualties than the 1960s version. 
The constant media presence in Northern Ireland, according to the author, has resulted in 
increased restrictions in the conduct of operations beyond those normally associated with 
the principle of "minimum force," the standard for conduct in previous campaigns. 
Handling the media in many post-imperial campaigns became an essential part of 
operational planning rather than simply an after thought. Television coverage has also 
brought the public closer to the conflict and increased sensitivity to casualties. As 
Mockaitis observes: "... it is hard to imagine a British public tolerating 4,436 casualties 
including 509 dead suffered by a national service army during the highly successful 
Malayan Emergency campaign." (pp. 14445)  
The author also cites technical and logistical advancements as having a significant impact 
on post-imperial counterinsurgency, especially the advent of helicopters, and 
improvements in firepower and weaponry. Although both gov ernment forces and 
insurgents have both reaped gains in the technological arena, Mockaitis gives the edge to 
the police and military, especially in later years with the introduction of computers for the 
processing of intelligence data.  
The conclusions offered in British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era are well 
reasoned and amply supported by the available documentation. The work provides a 
useful bridge in understanding the transition from imperial to post-imperial 
counterinsurgency and sheds valuable light on the uneven devel opment of British 
doctrine from the early 1960s to the current situation in Northern Ireland. The author 
offers the principles developed and refined during this period as a possible model for use 
in future United Nations peacekeeping operations.  
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